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With the global economic downturn and its implications for the broader political and security 
architecture of the EU, the Polish–Romanian Strategic Partnership signed in 2009 is now ripe to take 
the positive relationship to a new level and to be further fleshed out. To this end, political coordination 
needs to be upgraded for promoting common interests, such as economic stability and solidarity within 
the Union, continued support to agriculture and Cohesion Policy as an important priority for EU 
funding, increasing the energy security of the region, engaging the neighbourhood, particularly Moldova 
and Ukraine, and maintaining the relevance of CSDP and of article 5 of the Washington Treaty high 
on the European agenda. The management of instability and protracted conflicts in their 
neighbourhood are also among their shared concerns. Translating these common priorities into 
concrete actions should aim at pushing the “turbo button” on the partnership, and help both countries 
achieve their goals.  
The close comparison between Poland and Romania stems mainly from their size, both in terms of land and 
population, but also from similar collective experiences in recent history and their current potential to 
contribute to the stability and prosperity of their neighbourhood. These common features explain the 
mutual priorities and interests of the two countries in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond. 
1. Common Priorities in the EU 
As key players in Central and Eastern Europe, Poland and Romania have an interest in functional 
membership, supported by transparent consultation within the EU, in which they can contribute effectively 
to the decision making processes which affect them. As the two manage EU and NATO external borders, 
they bring a particular vision, aimed at maintaining the attractiveness of the European project in their 
neighbours’ eyes, and address constructively the transition processes in their proximity. This task is 
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particularly difficult, given the different approaches among Member States in balancing their national 
economic agendas against their political and security priorities. 
Polish–Romanian cooperation in the EU must aim to support and extend the attractiveness and credibility 
of the European project, through the obvious benefits the two countries are experiencing, and in spite of 
the transition difficulties they have encountered. With a view to that end, they should work together for 
access to the single market, free movement of people, the possibility of appointments to EU institutions and 
influence on the European decision-making process, increased civic participation, and public accountability 
of civil servants. 
Among the political and economic issues at the top of the common agenda, both countries are 
interested in keeping the European Council as the main forum for decision-making in the Union, including 
decisions regarding economic and monetary issues. At European level, there is increasing consensus that 
the austerity policies so far adopted need to be complemented by growth-inducing initiatives. Romania has 
supported and efficiently implemented budgetary discipline as an objective, but further policy proposals 
aimed at stimulating growth are needed, in cooperation with Poland. At the same time, it is important that 
Romania coordinates with Poland in shaping the political debate on the future of the Eurozone, and that it 
turns its economic stability into political capital at EU level.  
Defending Workers’ Free Mobility in the EU 
The full respect and implementation of the right of free circulation of people in the EU, as one of the four 
main pillars of European integration, is vital in order to ensure workers’ mobility as an incentive for cross-
border development and as a self-correcting tool for those European markets which lack sufficient labour 
forces. Romania and Poland should work together to ensure that this issue is not politicised by some older 
Member States, especially in the context of the run-up to next year’s European Parliamentary elections. 
Concerted efforts, especially by Romanian and Polish MEPs and academic communities from the two 
nations, should aim to ensure that European rights are applied equally, considering the recent treatment 
applied to Romania’s Schengen bid.  
Coordinated approaches should target improving information in European media about the positive impact 
of the free mobility of workers’ from Eastern Europe in the economies of destination countries, given the 
need for labour on the markets of older Member States that are faced with increasingly aging populations. 
Demographic conditions in many old Member States, and labour shortages in numerous professional 
categories across the EU, point to the role of labour mobility as one of the most solid engines for the 
growth and diversification of European economies. 
There is also major role also for the Polish and Romanian civil societies and non-governmental 
organisations, in jointly promoting respect for Copenhagen criteria. Polls conducted ahead of the 2014 
European Parliamentary elections do not bode well for European democracies, particularly for centre 
parties, as more Europeans tend to slide towards extremist groups. Particularly worrying is the continued 
rise of xenophobic and anti-European attitudes in many EU Member States, including older ones, which 
gives a sense of overall deterioration of democratisation processes across the Union.  
Congruent Positions on the European Budget 
Poland and Romania also share interests in the debate on the common EU budget, as both benefit to a large 
extent from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Cohesion Policy, which together constitute the 
bulk of EU spending. Actually, as the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–
2020 have proved, within the large but loose circle of  the “Friends of Cohesion” group,  Poland and 
Romania had particularly convergent positions, more than, for instance, among members of the Visegrad 
Group. They had common stances not only in general terms, such as seeking to maximise allocations in the 
Cohesion Policy and the CAP by maintaining the higher EU co-financing rate of 85% for both, but also 
agreed on smaller technical details. Additionally, they both opposed the older Member States’ push for  
a shift of emphasis from support for agriculture towards research and development or the relocation of 
funds from the least developed regions towards more consolidated areas of the net contributor states. The 
Visegrad Plus format proved to be a good channel for communicating such streamlined messages on the EU 
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platform, through for instance repeated meetings of ministers of agriculture. Coordination of positions in 
this setup should continue beyond the finalisation of negotiations on the EU budget. 
Regarding Cohesion Policy, apart from mutual backing in debates at European level, there is also much 
room for cooperation at the phase of implementation. Given that Poland excelled in the rate of fund 
absorption during the 2007–2013 budget period, while Romania faced significant challenges in this respect, 
the latter should concentrate on Polish best practices in the field. Also, just ahead of territorial and 
administrative reform, Romania could seek inspiration from the Polish case, in which successful regional 
reform was carried out gradually from the early 1990s. A first step towards transfer of experience was the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Ministries of Regional Development in 
September, which should lead not only to more frequent ministerial level meetings, but also to intense 
expert level communication. 
Cooperation in the Energy Sector 
When it comes to energy policy, Poland and Romania—in common with other countries in the region—
share the same concerns of security of supply, energy efficiency and the tensions between the severe 
environmental and market liberalisation expectations of the EU and national economic interests. Even 
without a common geographical border, such convergences serve as a solid foundation for cooperation. 
This can be on a bilateral level, just as on multi-lateral platforms—be that the EU or the V4 Plus format.  
Since both Romania and Poland are among the countries paying the highest prices for Russian gas imports 
Europe-wide (in 2012 Poland paid an average price of $525 and Romania $440 per thousand cubic metres), 
their efforts should be joined to speed up the integration of the regional market and with this pave 
the way for a liberalised single European energy market. To this end, Romania has already joined the 
regional electric power market coupling, started by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Poland, too, 
cooperates with them, as the initiative is meant to be a first step towards developing the single European 
Internal Electricity Market. Efforts towards integration of the gas market are also being undertaken by the 
V4 (a “Road Map towards a Regional V4 Gas Market” was adopted by the Visegrad states in June), yet this 
process will require much more political determination than in the case of the electricity market, which is  
a more business-driven sector. In any case, Romania should not miss the chance to join this initiative too.  
In respect to developing the physical infrastructure needed for regional market integration, considerable 
steps have been taken in the gas market in the framework of the North-South gas corridor project in which 
both countries are involved. Yet, mindful of the emerging trend of short-term pricing which will make it 
even more difficult to ensure investments for building pipelines characterised by longer amortisation 
periods, Romania and Poland should look for new long-term investment solutions. To this end, national 
energy companies should be encouraged to coordinate large infrastructural projects, as well as lobbying for 
more EU funding. In comparison with the gas sector, the interconnection of power grids is lagging behind. 
This would be much needed, for instance to help mitigate Romania’s excess power production from 
renewable sources, or Poland’s heavy reliance on coal-based power which is increasingly inconsistent with 
the EU climate regulations.  
A further common interest relates to shale gas development, given that both countries possess shale 
gas reserves and are considering the possibilities and risks of its exploration and exploitation. As the 
European Commission seeks to elaborate regulations on shale gas, Romania and Poland should participate 
actively in the EU level debate and consult each other regularly, as well as other Member States facing the 
dilemmas of shale gas development. Common efforts should also be invested in drawing up scientific studies 
on the geological, technological, economic and regulatory aspects of shale gas development. Contrary to 
appearances, no spirit of competition should hinder Polish–Romanian cooperation in this field, given the 
geographical distance, lack of interconnectedness and the trends of growing gas demands in Europe. 
The recently emerging practice of consultations in the V4 Plus Romania and Bulgaria format on 
various energy and climate issues has proved productive and should be improved further. Regular political, 
administrative and expert-level consultations should be held, to coordinate national energy policies and 
foster harmonisation of national market regulation. The V4 Plus would also serve as a useful platform for 
converging positions on various EU energy initiatives, such as the TEN-E regulation or the Connecting 
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Europe Facility. Together, these countries can also assist the European Commission in fully investigating 
Gazprom’s antitrust probe, launched in December 2012, and invite it to participate in negotiating long-term 
gas contracts with Gazprom. 
The establishment of consultation mechanisms at both institutional and company levels is also advisable 
in a bilateral setup. This could facilitate the transfer of Polish experience in shale gas development (Poland 
being at the most advanced stage Europe-wide), and in the construction of the LNG terminal at 
Świnoujście, in view of Romania’s plans to build a similar terminal at ConstanŃa. Innovative solutions, such 
as the new private, equity-style, state-run infrastructure investment fund set up by the Polish Treasury 
Ministry can also be inspirational for Romania. Debates on draft legislation on hydrocarbons should be 
analysed in Romania too, where updating the energy strategy and complementing it with a long-term view 
on non-conventional sources is of utmost urgency. In turn, Romania has know-how to offer in the 
electricity and oil sectors, as well as in gas production, given that its tradition in that sector spans more 
than a century. 
2. Synergy on Ukraine and Moldova  
Finding a Common Denominator in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
Regarding the Eastern Neighbourhood, the strategic partnership helped to overcome Romania’s initial 
hesitation about the Eastern Partnership (EaP), co-authored by Poland with Sweden. Regular official 
consultations lessened suspicions concerning each other’s intentions in the immediate vicinity, and 
improved the level of trust between sides to some extent. There is overwhelming consensus that 
Poland and Romania share a strong long-term interest to be bordered by well-governed and prosperous 
neighbours who are fully integrated in the EU. In practical terms, convergence of interests in the 
neighbourhood has shaped the political discourse as well as helped coordinate efforts inside the EU in 
support of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Association bid. 
There are multiple economic links, as well as political and security interests, which bind the four 
countries. In the EU, Poland and Romania are among the most important trade partners of Ukraine and 
Moldova respectively. Economic exchanges are poised to deepen once Ukraine and Moldova sign 
Association Agreements (AA) with the EU, envisioning the establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Integration of Ukraine and Moldova into the European market will open new 
avenues for Polish and Romanian investments. In addition to enhanced commerce, Poland and Romania 
represent main entry points connecting Ukraine and Moldova with the EU’s critical infrastructure, including 
highways, pipelines, railways and power grids. As limitrophe states, Poland and Romania strive to push the 
EU’s frontier further to the east, extending the perimeter of security and prosperity. Naturally, their efforts 
focus on Ukraine and Moldova, states which enjoy the most advanced political and economic relations with 
EU and often act as trend-setters for other EaP states. Therefore, Bucharest and Warsaw share a common 
position on supporting Moldova and Ukraine’s pro-European and pro-democratisation orientation. Poland 
and Romania also share a common interest in finding a sustainable resolution to the Transnistrian conflict, 
which would neutralise security risks for Ukraine and Moldova. Romania is increasingly aware of Ukraine’s 
importance for Moldova’s European future. However, this outlook has not been yet clearly articulated in 
bilateral relations with Ukraine. Polish–Romanian strategic partnership in the Eastern Neighbourhood could 
contribute to more functional and mutually beneficial Romanian–Ukrainian relations in the wider European 
context.  
As Ukraine and Moldova are about to upgrade relations with the EU, implementation of the post-Vilnius 
agenda will require more synergy than before between Bucharest and Warsaw. 
The immediate task of Poland and Romania is to get the green light for Ukraine to sign an AA, and for 
Moldova to initialise one, as well as to receive confirmation on completion of the second phase of the visa 
liberalisation plan. However, while building momentum for positive outcomes at the EaP Summit in Vilnius 
(28–29 November), Warsaw and Bucharest have to plan and work on an agenda which looks beyond 2013, 
to the next EaP Summit, in 2015, in Riga. Poland and Romania will have to act together on several levels, 
employing government, parliament, local authorities and civil society. 
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Post-Vilnius Agenda 
Poland and Romania could help to smooth out the decision-making process within the EU, and to 
lay foundations for AA implementation. If signed, the AA with Ukraine will have to be followed by 
parliamentary diplomacy in EU Member States. In addition to governmental efforts, parliamentary groups of 
friendship from Poland and Romania, with colleagues from other EU Member States, will have to launch an 
active campaign to convince parliaments to ratify the AA with Ukraine. If an AA is initialised with Moldova, 
Romania and Poland must keep the spotlight of the EU on the urgency of signing the accord before the EU 
Commission mandate expires (at the end of October 2014), and ahead of parliamentary elections in 
Moldova, to be held in late 2014. It is vital for Moldova that an AA obtains juridical force through  
a provisional clause before the elections, which might bring to power less EU-oriented political forces. If 
the EU confirms completion of Moldova’s second stage of the visa liberalisation plan, Polish and Romanian 
European MPs will have to work together inside the main European political groups in order to get the 
approval of the EU Parliament on visa liberalisation, before the European Parliamentary elections scheduled 
for May 2014. In parallel, Poland and Romania could, alongside other, with like-minded Member States, to 
build support inside the EU Council of Interior Ministers for final approval of visa waiver. Visa liberalisation 
with Moldova will provide a necessary boost to pro-European forces ahead of elections, and will make 
Moldovan passports more attractive for the population living in Transnistria. The elimination of visas for 
Moldovans could indirectly speed up Ukraine’s implementation of the visa-free action plan. Overall, visa-
free travel with Ukraine and Moldova will upgrade the EU’s soft power, weakened by the economic crisis. 
As Ukraine and Moldova could soon sign AAs, Poland and Romania could share expertise on setting up 
domestic inter-ministerial mechanisms aimed at streamlining government actions towards 
implementation of association agenda. Finally, Romania and Poland cannot avoid horse trading concerning 
the next EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. Warsaw and Bucharest 
must work together to secure nominations from like-minded EU Member States, as the decisions of the 
outgoing commissioner were almost in line with the foreign policy of his country of origin.             
Poland and Romania could help make states stronger, secure and attractive. Ukraine and Moldova 
are facing a wide range of risks in the autonomies in Crimea, and Gagauzia, and in particular in the 
separatist republic of Transnistria, all of which are regions in which Russia has several levers which may be 
pulled as spoilers. Poland and Romania, in synergy with the EU, and in some cases (given the cultural and 
historical roots of Turks, Crimean Tatars and Gagauz), with Turkey, must expand cultural ties and support 
development in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (ATU Gagauzia) and the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea (AR Crimea). The Polish government has already established sectoral cooperation with 
the Ministry of Culture of AR Crimea, and Polish NGOs have developed projects in partnership with the 
region’s civil society. In turn, local authorities from Constanta County, home of the Turkish minority in 
Romania, could establish ties with AR Crimea, organising cultural events and youth exchanges. More cities 
or villages from Poland and Romania could follow the example of Wrocław’s initiative in Gagauzia. There is 
room for cooperation between Romania and Poland in providing development aid to Gagauzia, to 
strengthen aid projects implemented by Turkey and the EU in the region. Romania’s aid to Gagauzia, aimed 
at improving living conditions, will help to dispel negative perceptions. As a solution to Transnistria is not 
in sight, Poland and Romania must work via the EU to dissuade Russia from escalating the situation in the 
region and to keep the 5+2 talks on track. While organising events and debates, Poland and Romania 
should consider inviting participants from Transnistria. The conference held in Romania (Sibiu) in 2013 and 
attended by representatives from Transnistria should not be an exception, and regular dialogue facilitated 
by universities and think-tanks from Poland and Romania will be much welcomed. 
Energy security is a critical issue for both Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine is in the middle of implementing 
a gas sources diversification strategy. Poland already pumps gas in reverse mode from Germany to Ukraine. 
A similar option is under discussion with Romania. Although the volume of gas which can transit Romania 
to Ukraine are not significant at this stage, signing a gas transit agreement would be a trust-building 
measure between Kiev and Bucharest that could contribute to a further thaw in bilateral relations. Given 
Russia’s obstruction of similar deal between Slovakia (which has the greatest transit capacities among 
neighbours) and Ukraine, Poland might consider expanding its gas transit network with Ukraine. As regards 
Romania, the tempo of building the gas pipeline Iași–Ungheni and interconnecting electricity networks must 
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speed up. Romania must prepare the second stage of the project—a compressor station—in order to be 
able use the gas interconnector with Moldova to its full capacity (1.5 bcm). 
A DCFTA as part of an Association Agreement is the most powerful transformation tool the EaP 
provides. Poland and Romania must assist Ukraine and Moldova in the DCFTA implementation phase. 
Ultimately, economic de-monopolisation, enhanced transparency, and fair competition are in the interests 
of Polish and Romanian investors. Both states already implement projects to strengthen institutional 
capacity in Ukraine and Moldova. In the coming years, Poland could share with Ukraine and Moldova its 
experience in reforming the agricultural sector, helping to boost exports to the EU market. Romania could 
extend positive anti-corruption experience, transferring this not only to Moldova but also to Ukraine, when 
authorities in Kiev are ready to accept such assistance. Islands of reform in Ukraine and Moldova deserve 
special support. For instance, the Ministry of Education in Moldova pushed a law on the National Agency 
for Quality Assurance in High Education through parliament. A similar agency in Romania could be  
a valuable partner in setting up the institution in Moldova. The Interior Ministry in Moldova is implementing 
the most profound structural reform in decades. Poland and Romania could make this reform sustainable in 
the long term, by helping with expertise and technical assistance to create the Police College which will 
prepare the next generation of well-trained policemen.             
Despite the geographical proximity of the four states, it sometimes takes too long to travel between them. 
There is more to be done in terms of compressing distances and facilitating people-to-people 
contacts. Since January 2013 there have been no direct flights between Bucharest and Kiev. Romania and 
Ukraine have to consider reviving direct air communication between capitals, and potentially expanding 
the list of cities connected by air transport (Cluj-Napoca, Suceava, Timișoara, Odessa, Lviv). Such  
a measure could help the development of tourism and business contacts between communities. Because of 
different track gauges and the lengthy bogie exchange at Ungheni, rail travel between Bucharest and 
Chișinău lasts between one and two hours longer than it could. Romania and Moldova should consider 
introducing automatic change of wheel track (SUW 2000), a solution successfully applied on the Kraków–
Kiev rail line at Mostyska customs checkpoint.  
There is only one pedestrian border crossing route between Poland and Ukraine, at Shehyni–Medyka, and 
none between Romania and Moldova, as the bilateral inter-state agreement envisions only rail and road 
crossings. Several border crossings between Romania and Ukraine have been closed since 2007 for 
technical reasons. While Poland should multiply pedestrian border crossings with Ukraine, Romania and 
Moldova must review their accord, in order to allow the pedestrian border crossings for locals and 
international travellers to be opened. In order to link communities living along the border, Romania and 
Ukraine should re-open previously closed border check points and inaugurate new ones, plans which have 
been on the back burner since 2011. Negotiations on a small-scale traffic treaty, which began in 2008, 
should be concluded swiftly. Similar accords are already in place between Ukraine and Slovakia, and 
Hungary and Poland, and deliver benefits to all involved. Among other things, the treaty will facilitate 
contacts between the Romanian minority residing in Ukraine (often along the frontier) and Romania. In 
turn, Ukraine has to show a constructive approach by approving the expansion of consular sections of 
Romania in Ukraine, aimed at the timely review of applications for small-scale traffic permits. Not least, 
Poland is considering further simplification of the visa regime with Ukraine after the Vilnius Summit. 
Romania could follow suit as part of a strategy to build good neighbourly relations with Ukraine. 
3. Common Security and Defence Agenda. Deepening the Transatlantic Component 
Romania and Poland understand, more than other European states, the need to have reliable and sincere 
regional partners, and, in the context of the economic downturn, the challenges of increasingly assuming 
the burdens of regional security. In a time when most Europeans cut down on their defence spending, the 
two nations chose to invest in modernised military equipment, and to contribute to NATO and CDSP 
activities. These developments echo the desire of the United States to have allies in Europe that are able to 
share the security burden effectively. Both Romanians and Poles consider that the U.S. presence in Europe 
enhances their national security, and that close cooperation with Turkey on regional security is of utmost 
importance, in the trilateral Polish–Romanian–Turkish formats. Though U.S. officials have constantly 
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reiterated that the U.S. pivot towards Asia takes place with Europe’s participation, it appears necessary for 
the U.S. to sort out its budget cuts problem if is to stay engaged as it has done so far. The sense of urgency 
raised by the recent U.S. budget deadlock, with implications for political and diplomatic engagement with 
the EU, makes Romanian–Polish cooperation in the field even more important. It is beneficial that Romania 
and Poland’s responses remain multi-lateral and take aboard like-minded partners in the region, such as 
Turkey, given the complexity of challenges faced, among which are protracted conflicts in their proximity 
and rising instability in Southern Europe and Central Asia.  
In NATO, and in bilateral formats with Russia, strategic reflection, aimed at a pragmatic approach, is 
needed as regards the future path of relations. Bucharest and Warsaw place equal value on reciprocity and 
transparency in relations with Moscow, adopting a prudent, cooperative approach. Recently, political 
contacts between Romania and Russia have been upgraded, with the two sides showing increased interest 
in extending their fields of cooperation. Within NATO’s framework, Romania’s significant traditional 
expertise on the MENA region, and Poland’s positive transition experience, can contribute significantly to 
the development of the Mediterranean Dialogue and to the societal transformations the region is 
experiencing. In the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood, Romania and Poland could contribute towards 
alleviating the situation of Syrian refugees, and of neighbouring countries affected by these flows. Both 
Bucharest and Warsaw are perceived as impartial players on the Syrian situation, given their common 
decision not to provide either side with arms.  
A common approach to all major international security issues played an important role in the decision to 
elevate bilateral contact to the level of strategic partnership in October 2009. Security issues have also 
been placed high on the agenda of the Romanian–Polish Strategic Dialogue, inaugurated in 2012. Signing of 
the Polish–Romanian agreement on bilateral defence cooperation in June 2013 confirmed that there exists 
further potential for collaboration between the armed forces and defence industries of these countries.  
NATO, CSDP and Bilateral Security Relationships  
Regarding the role of the United States, both countries attach great importance to the relationship with 
Washington and consider the active engagement of the United States in Europe as a factor strengthening 
their security. Romania and Poland continue to pursue strong bilateral contacts with Washington, including 
armed forces cooperation. Highest importance is attached to the deployment of the elements of the U.S. 
Missile Defence system in Romania (Deveselu) and in Poland (Redzikowo). Both countries work to 
implement the plans to build MD installations, in the 2015 framework for Romania and 2018 for Poland. 
Both Romania and Poland assumed that investing in the relationship with the U.S. requires them to support 
the United States during security-related crises, also by deploying troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Romania and Poland share similar positions regarding the recent developments in European security. 
Competing agendas among EU members and the spill-over effects of the European crisis upon national 
foreign policies risk deepening current differences over the achievement of comprehensive and constructive 
European external action. The overall rethinking of the EU’s responses to the security challenges 
calls for a review of the instrument best suited to tackle the whole spectrum of conventional and non-
conventional challenges, the European Security Strategy (ESS). Here, Romania and Poland share deep 
interests, ranging from energy independence and migration management to territorial security. Both 
countries can present their visions on how the instruments and capabilities in this field should be defined 
and implemented, considering Romanian and Polish expertise in post-conflict reconstruction and preventive 
diplomacy, tested in NATO and CSDP operations alike. 
Regarding NATO, both Romania and Poland consequently underline that the common defence clause 
embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty remains the cornerstone of the Alliance. The need to set 
the right balance between defence and out-of-area operations was a common Polish and Romanian demand 
during work on the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and the subsequent Deterrence and Defence Posture 
Review. Both countries support returning to more comprehensive defence planning and Article 5-related 
exercises. Importantly, Romania deployed troops to participate in the November 2013 Steadfast Jazz 
exercises in Poland and the Baltic states, which were designed to test the readiness of the NATO Response 
Force. Romania and Poland also share an interest in developing closer relations with the immediate 
neighbours of the Alliance. Understandably, Romania looks more towards the Balkans and the Black Sea 
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region, while Poland’s focus is on the Baltic dimension, Ukraine and Georgia. To both countries, the open 
door policy of the Alliance remains a principle they constantly support.  
Romania and Poland attach also importance to developing a closer relationship with Turkey, which is an 
important partner in several aspects. As a NATO country bordering unstable regions, it is interested in 
upholding the common defence function of the Alliance. It also has a stake in the stability of the Black Sea 
and Caucasus regions. As a strong proponent of developing indigenous defence capabilities, it is an 
attractive model for both Poland and Romania which are trying to revive their own defence industries.  
On Russia, the historical experiences and geography forces both Romania and Poland to pay close attention 
to developments of the Russian security policy. Russia has been significantly upgrading its military potential, 
which, according to Warsaw and Bucharest should not be overlooked by NATO. At the same time, both 
countries have expressed an interest in building good relations with Russia in the security sphere, on the 
basis of reciprocity and equality. Poland seems to be more advanced than Romania in pursuing pragmatic 
cooperation with Russia, as well as in making attempts at resolving the difficult historical legacy issues.  
Next Steps in Security Cooperation 
Having established the foundations of the Strategic Partnership and the mechanisms for dialogue, the 
necessary next steps should include the implementation of specific cooperation projects and political 
initiatives on security issues which would serve as internationally recognised trademarks of the Partnership. 
Both countries can use elements of their unique partnership with the United States to pursue cooperation 
in a trilateral format. Since Romania will be the first country to host the U.S. Missile Defence installation, it 
could involve Polish experts in the process of constructing the base. Conversely, Poland can invite the 
Romanian experts to study the Polish system of the utilisation of F-16 aircraft (Romania recently decided to 
acquire F-16s), and later also invite the Romanian Air Forces to joint training with the participation  of the 
U.S. aviation detachment stationed in Poland.  
Romanian and Polish decision makers should furthermore coordinate their efforts to loosen visa 
requirements for their citizens travelling to the United States, so as to boost economic and social 
exchanges. 
In the NATO framework, one of the biggest challenges post-ISAF would be to sustain the level of 
interoperability and cooperation between the Allies. Steadfast Jazz 2013 should not be a one-off event of 
this scale and complexity on the territories of Central Europe. Poland and Romania could start working on 
the next major multi-lateral exercises (or a series of exercises) with major involvement the Polish and 
Romanian forces, open to other NATO countries. In the meantime, Polish and Romanian armed forces 
should train more frequently together and exchange lessons learned from operations such as Afghanistan 
or maritime deployments. 
Another challenge for NATO is to define the future course of the NATO–Russia relationship. The Alliance 
is currently working on proposals to Russia regarding transparency and arms control measures connected 
with non-strategic nuclear weapons and conventional armaments. On these measures, Poland and Romania 
may come to a similar position on the wisdom of “cautious engagement” with Russia. They could, possibly 
with Turkey and other like-minded countries from the region, prepare a common position on arms control 
issues with Russia for the internal consideration of the Alliance.  
Finally, cooperation between the military industries should be encouraged, based on the information about 
the demand of the two armed forces. Poland is in the process of a significant upgrading of its military 
potential. Romania is also planning to reach the level of the 2% GDP for defence-related spending. The 
Polish plans for new defence equipment acquisition assume that roughly one-third of the defence budget 
(roughly $43 billion) could be spent on new systems over the next decade. Some of the capabilities sought 
by Poland are the same as the Romanian military’s requirements. The first step in selecting specific 
elements for joint efforts should be to map the present potential and offers of the Polish and Romanian 
defence industry and research facilities to identify potential fields of cooperation. In some areas, it may also 
be beneficial to involve the Turkish and V4 partners in the discussion.  
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Conclusions  
Poland and Romania have, through concerted action, the potential to contribute to rendering the European 
project more flexible, to open it up towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, and to improve European 
security. The Strategic Partnership offers a particular setting to reinforce coordination between the two 
countries in forging common positions on the major political and economic debates at the European level. 
These include navigating the European post-crisis agenda from austerity towards support for growth and 
employment, consolidating the Economic and Monetary Union (and within this, accommodating the 
positions of non-Eurozone members such as Poland and Romania), maintenance of a European budget 
favourable for the net beneficiaries, and safeguarding the principle and practice of the free movement of 
labour. Given the commonalities in the energy security of the countries, they should utilise both bilateral 
and multi-lateral platforms to push forward the regional integration of the energy market and to claim  
a voice in the debate on the future of shale gas in Europe. In the case of most European issues, the V4 Plus 
format can serve as a useful channel for Poland in involving Romania in shaping a regional view and 
communicating common interests. 
Going beyond the EU’s internal design, the Polish-Romanian tandem should also aim at upgrading the EU’s 
commitment towards the Eastern Neighbourhood, from a strictly institutional design into one with more 
political significance, difficult as this may be in the current context. Bilateral coordination of political 
support for Moldova and Ukraine’s European association requires long-term strategic vision, but has clear 
mutual benefits.  The increasingly coordinated approaches of Bucharest and Warsaw towards Moldova and 
Ukraine’s pro-European path will have long-term benefits for these two, provided that the present political 
engagement in the two eastern partners continues, irrespective of developments at the Vilnius summit. 
Finally, given the similar approach to the main security challenges for Europe and to the issue of the future 
of NATO and the EU’s security dimension, the next step towards turning the Strategic Partnership 
premises into tangible results should see Poland and Romania coordinating and presenting common 
initiatives. The coming months could create opportunities for displaying such unified positions. At EU level, 
Romania and Poland should contribute to advancing the debate at the December 2013 European Defence 
Council meeting, on the factors which have so far hindered the Union’s ability to define a geopolitical vision 
of its own, particularly in relation to its neighbourhood. Joint efforts should also aim to reach a common 
assessment of the CSDP in terms of capabilities, EDA’s role and industry development, and striking  
a balance with engagement in NATO. At NATO, the 2014 Summit is to take place in the United Kingdom. 
Both Poland and Romania can contribute their joint assessment of the agenda for a post-ISAF Alliance, 
including renewed emphasis on exercises, a joint approach to acquiring key capabilities, and a realistic 
agenda with Russia. 
 
 
 
